Abstract Algebraic and fast algebraic attacks are power tools to analyze stream ciphers. A class of symmetric Boolean functions with maximum algebraic immunity were found vulnerable to fast algebraic attacks at EU-ROCRYPT'06. Recently, the notion of AAR (algebraic attack resistant) functions was introduced as a unified measure of protection against both classical algebraic and fast algebraic attacks. In this correspondence, we first give a decomposition of symmetric Boolean functions, then we show that almost all symmetric Boolean functions, including these functions with good algebraic immunity, behave badly against fast algebraic attacks, and we also prove that no symmetric Boolean functions are AAR functions. Besides, we improve the relations between algebraic degree and algebraic immunity of symmetric Boolean functions.
Introduction
Boolean functions are frequently used in the design of stream ciphers, block ciphers and hash functions. One of the most vital roles in cryptography of Boolean functions is to be used as filter and combination generators of stream ciphers based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs). Symmetric functions are an interesting subclass of Boolean functions for their advantage in both implementation complexity and storage space (see [5] ).
In recent years, algebraic and fast algebraic attacks [7, 15, 6, 1] have been regarded as a great threat against LFSR-based stream ciphers. These attacks use cleverly overdefined systems of multi-variable nonlinear equations to recover the secret key. Algebraic attacks lower the degree of the equations by multiplying a nonzero function while fast algebraic attacks by linear combination. Thus algebraic immunity (AI) was introduced in [15] to measure the ability of Boolean functions to resist algebraic attacks while the notion of AAR (algebraic attack resistant) functions in [11] as a unified measure of protection against both classical algebraic and fast algebraic attacks.
The maximum algebraic immunity (MAI) of n-variable Boolean functions is ⌈ n 2 ⌉ [7] . The majority function achieves MAI [8, 3] . For odd n, the majority function is the only symmetric MAI functions, up to addition of a constant [12, 18] . However, the majority function was found vulnerable to fast algebraic attacks in [2] at EUROCRYPT'06.
All the symmetric MAI functions on 2 m variables were obtained in [17, 14] and were proven having algebraic degree 2 m−1 or 2 m . Moreover, all the symmetric functions on 2 m + 1 variables with sub-MAI 2 m−1 were derived in [13] . A general method to construct symmetric MAI functions was further provided in [16] . Nevertheless, we find all these functions but few very vulnerable to fast algebraic attacks despite their resistance against classical algebraic attacks.
A preprocessing of fast algebraic attacks on LFSR-based stream ciphers, which use a Boolean function f as the filter or combination generator, is to find a function g of small degree such that the multiple gf has degree not too large. For any pair of integers (e, d) such that e + d ≥ n, there is a nonzero function g of degree at most e such that gf has degree at most d [6] . We concentrate on the minimum of e + d and introduce the notion of fast algebraic immunity (FAI), which generalizes the notion of AAR. The full fast algebraic immunity (FFAI) of Boolean functions is n and FFAI functions are equivalent to AAR functions.
In this correspondence, the fast algebraic immunity of symmetric Boolean functions is studied. It's found that any symmetric function is a composition of a Boolean function and elementary symmetric functions with degree equal to a power of 2 and that the set of all symmetric functions with degree at most 2 k − 1 is a ring generated by σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 4 , · · · , σ 2 k−1 and isomorphic to B k . It's further shown that almost all symmetric Boolean functions behave badly against fast algebraic attacks. For one thing, any symmetric function with degree not equal to a power of 2 has FAI strictly less than its degree, for another, in the case n close to 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ , symmetric functions with AI at least 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ /2 have FAI close to n/2, which is almost the worst case against fast algebraic attacks. Unfortunately, all but few symmetric functions shown to be immune to classical algebraic attacks in the previous literatures, such as [17, 14, 13, 16] , fall into the case that n is either equal to or a little more than 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ . One (or more) function g with small degree, such that gf has degree not large, is straightway derived from the SANFV of f , while the algorithm proposed in [2] at EUROCRYPT'06 to determine g and gf for a symmetric function f has complexity O(n 3 ). Furthermore, it's proven that there exist no symmetric FFAI (i.e. AAR) functions. Lastly, the relations between algebraic degree and algebraic immunity of symmetric Boolean functions are improved. 2 ⌊log 2 (2a−1)⌋ is the lower degree of symmetric functions with AI a. This bound is tight for symmetric MAI functions.
The remainder of this correspondence is organized as follows. In Section 2, some basic concepts are provided and the notion of fast algebraic immunity is introduced, while Section 3 presents the decomposition of symmetric functions. Section 4 studies the fast algebraic immunity of symmetric functions and Section 5 discusses the relations between algebraic degree and algebraic immunity of symmetric functions. Section 6 concludes the correspondence.
Preliminary
An n-variable Boolean function is a mapping from F n 2 into F 2 , where F 2 denote the binary field. A Boolean function is said to be symmetric if its output is invariant under any permutation of its input bits. Denote by B n (resp. SB n ) the set of all Boolean functions (resp. symmetric Boolean functions) on n variables. Any function f ∈ B n can be uniquely represented as a truth table
or as a multivariate polynomial over F 2 , called the algebraic normal form (ANF),
The algebraic degree of f , denoted by deg(f ), is given by max ac =0 wt(c), where wt(c) denote the Hamming weight of c. Any function f ∈ SB n can be uniquely represented as a vector
where v f (i) represents the function value for vectors of weight i. Let σ i be the i-th elementary symmetric function of x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n . The symmetric function f can also be uniquely represented as
is called the simplified algebraic normal form vector (SANFV) of f . More properties of symmetric Boolean functions can be found in [5] . The algebraic immunity of Boolean functions is defined as follows.
Definition 1.
[15] Let f be an n-variable Boolean function. The algebraic immunity (AI) of f , denoted by AI(f ), is defined as
To resist fast algebraic attacks, the Boolean function f shouldn't admit a function g of small degree such that the multiple gf has degree not too large. There are several notions of the immunity of Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks in previous literatures, such as [10] , but they separately treat the two parameters deg(g) and deg(gf ). Recently, the notion of AAR (algebraic attack resistant) functions was introduced in [11] as a unified measure of protection against classical algebraic attacks as well as fast algebraic attacks.
Definition 2. [11] Let
However, AAR is too restrictive to achieve. A 9-variable AAR function was observed in [4] . A class of almost AAR functions were constructed in [11] by iteration. While it's still unknown whether there are AAR functions for any n.
For any Boolean function f , from the definition of AI there always exists a function g of degree equal to AI(f ) such that gf = 0 or gf = g. Therefore the minimum of deg(g) + deg(gf ) is smaller than or equal to 2AI(f ). The notion of fast algebraic immunity is introduced as follows.
Definition 3. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function. The fast algebraic immunity (FAI) of the function f , denoted by F AI(f ), is defined as
From the above definition, we know that
for any nonconstant function g with degree less than AI(f ) and deg(l) + deg(lf ) ≤ deg(f ) + 2 for any affine function l.
For any pair of integers (e, d) such that e + d ≥ n, there is a nonzero function g of degree at most e such that gf has degree at most d [6] . Hence, the full fast algebraic immunity (FFAI) of n-variable Boolean functions is n. It is clear that any Boolean function has AI greater than or equal to a half of its FAI. Therefore FFAI functions are also MAI functions and are equivalent to AAR functions. By almost FFAI or almost AAR functions we mean Boolean functions with FAI n − 1.
Decomposition of symmetric Boolean functions
Thereinafter, k i may be regarded as k i mod 2 ∈ F 2 if there is no ambiguousness. Lemma 1. Let σ i and σ j be i-th and j-th elementary symmetric Boolean functions on n variables, 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Then we have
Proof. Expanding the product σ i σ j gives n i n−i k−i i k−j monomials with degree k for j ≤ k ≤ j + i and 0 ≤ k ≤ n. Since the product σ i σ j is also a symmetric function and σ k consists of n k monomials with degree k, the coefficient of σ k in σ i σ j equals to
If j < 2 s , then j 2 s = 0 and
, and by Eq. (1) we have σ 2 s σ j = σ 2 s +j . Assuming s 1 < s 2 < · · · < s k without loss of generality, since 2
From the above corollary we obtain the following results proven in [3] .
3. σ i σ j = σ i∨j where ∨ means OR operation.
Proof. 1) It is affirmed by Corollary 2 (1).
2) It is derived from the fact that σ 2 m σ j = σ 2 m +j for j < 2 m by Corollary 2 (2) and there is no σ 2 m +j for 2 m + j > n.
3) It can be deduced from 1) since σ 2 2 s = σ 2 s . Thanks to the work above, the decomposition of symmetric Boolean functions is given as follows.
Theorem 4 (Decomposition of symmetric Boolean functions). Let f ∈ SB n and m = ⌊log 2 n⌋. 
In particular, if f has degree at most
2. Furthermore we have
where f i (k ≤ i ≤ m) and f − k are symmetric functions of degree at most 2 i − 1 and 2 k − 1.
Let F m+1 ∈ B m+1 and
The same proof shows
The symmetric function f i has degree at most 2 i − 1 since the degree of σ
Note that ⌈log 2 (n+1)⌉ = ⌊log 2 n⌋+1. Theorem 4 shows that an n-variable symmetric Boolean function corresponds to a ⌈log 2 (n + 1)⌉-variable Boolean function. Furthermore, a symmetric Boolean function of degree at most 2 k −1 corresponds to a k-variable Boolean function.
Then the set of all functions in SB n with degree at most 2 k − 1, denoted by SB
, is the ring < σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 4 , · · · , σ 2 k−1 > and isomorphic to B k .
Proof. From Theorem 4 we know SB
From Theorem 4 we know τ is a injection. By Lemma 1 we know σ The upper degree of the product of two symmetric Boolean functions is given as below.
Proof. It holds for t = 1 since SB
is a ring by Theorem 5. Consider the product σ i σ j with i ≤ 2 k − 1 and 2
From the above corollary we know SB
Fast algebraic attacks on symmetric Boolean functions
In this section, we will first show that fast algebraic attacks on symmetric Boolean functions work efficiently, and then prove the nonexistence of symmetric FFAI functions.
Then the multiple gf has degree at most 2t − 1. Moreover, if λ f (2t) = 0, then (σ 1 + 1)f , if nonzero, has degree 2s + 1 where s is maximum such that λ f (2s) = 1; if λ f (2t) = 1, then σ 1 f , if nonzero, has degree 2s + 1 where s is maximum such that λ f (2s) + λ f (2s + 1) = 1.
Proof. It's trivial for t = 0. Then assume t ≥ 1.
By Corollary 2, we have σ 1 σ 2i = σ 2i+1 and therefore σ 1 σ 2i+1 = σ 2i+1 . Hence
and therefore deg(h) = 2s + 1 when s is maximum such that λ f (2s) = 1.
and therefore deg(h) = 2s + 1 when s is maximum such that λ f (2s) + λ f (2s + 1) = 1.
Remark. If λ f (2s) = 0 (resp. λ f (2s) = λ f (2s + 1)) for any s with 0 ≤ s ≤ t, then we have (σ 1 + 1)f = 0 (resp. σ 1 f = 0).
Theorem 8 gives an affine function g such that gf has degree at most deg(f ) − 2 for odd deg(f ). In other words, any symmetric function with odd degree has FAI strictly smaller than its degree. Although the product gf has odd degree if gf = 0, we cannot apply the theorem recursively to gf to lower the degree of f since g · gf = g · f and (g + 1) · gf = 0 · f .
From Theorem 8, we know that 2 −t is the probability that gf = 0 and 2 −i the probability that gf has degree deg(f ) − 2i. Consequently, the expectation of the degree of gf is deg(f ) − 4 when deg(f ) is large.
Corollary 9. The expectation of the degree of the product gf of Theorem 8 is deg(f ) − 4 when deg(f ) tends to infinity. Now we consider symmetric Boolean functions with degree not equal to a power of 2.
, then there exists a nonconstant function g of degree at most e with e = deg(f ) mod 2 k such that the product gf has degree at most deg(f ) − e − 1.
λ f (i)σ i . By Corollary 2, we have σ t·2 k +i = σ t·2 k σ i for 0 ≤ i < 2 k , and therefore
and hence gf = gf − . On one hand, the symmetric function g has degree e; on the other hand, by Corollary 7, the function gf − has degree at most t · 2
The theorem not only proves the existence of the function g but also explicitly identifies several such functions. More exactly, the number of g's is 1 less than the weight of deg(f ).
Taking k = ⌊log 2 deg(f )⌋, if deg(f ) = 2 k then there is a nonconstant function g such that deg(g) + deg(gf ) ≤ deg(f ) − 1 and therefore the following result is obtained.
Theorem 10 and Corollary 11 show that symmetric functions with degree not equal to a power of 2 do not behave well against fast algebraic attacks. Then we consider the symmetric functions with degree 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ . For the case n − 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ large, 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ is very small compared with n and therefore the symmetric functions with degree 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ naturally behave badly against fast algebraic attacks. For n − 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ not too large, we will show fast algebraic attacks on the symmetric functions with any degree are also very efficient. These imply that almost all symmetric Boolean functions are vulnerable to fast algebraic attacks. Now we consider the symmetric functions on n variables, including the functions of degree equal to a power of 2, for the case n − 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ smaller than 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ /2 − 1.
m−1 + e with e = n − 2 m + 1.
Proof. By Theorem 4, we have Remark. The same proof shows that the theorem applies to e with n − 2 m < e < 2 m−1 , but e = n − 2 m + 1 is minimum.
Theorem 12 shows that symmetric functions on n variables with n − 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ not large are vulnerable to fast algebraic attacks. Especially if n is close to 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ , then e = n − 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ + 1 is close to 1 and d = 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ /2 + e is close to n/2, so e + d is close to n/2, and therefore the symmetric functions with AI at least 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ /2 are very vulnerable to fast algebraic attacks. For example, any symmetric MAI function f on 2 m variables admits the linear function σ 1 such that σ 1 f has degree 2 m−1 + 1 while any symmetric function f on 2 m + 1 variables with MAI 2 m−1 + 1 or sub-MAI 2 m−1 admits the quadratic function σ 2 such that σ 2 f has degree 2 m−1 + 2. They are almost the worst cases against fast algebraic attacks since any function with AI a has FAI at least a + 1. Unfortunately, the symmetric MAI functions obtained in [17, 14] are in the case n = 2 m and the symmetric sub-MAI functions derived in [13] have n = 2 m + 1. Moreover, the symmetric MAI functions constructed in [16, Theorem 2.4] 
, and therefore these functions admit σ e with e ≤ n/5 such that σ e f has degree at most 3n/5. 
Theorem 12 also gives
Corollary 13. Let f ∈ SB n and 2 m ≤ n < 2 m + 2 m−1 − 1. Then F AI(f ) ≤ max{2 m − 2, 2n − 3 · 2 m−1 + 2}.
Corollary 17. Let f ∈ SB n and AI(f ) = ⌈ n 2 ⌉. Then deg(f ) ≥ 2 ⌊log 2 (n−1)⌋ .
Proof. Since ⌈ n 2 ⌉ ≥ n 2
, by Corollary 16, we have deg(f ) ≥ 2 ⌊log 2 (n−1)⌋ .
For every n, there exist symmetric MAI functions on n variables of degree 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ . For example, the majority function f achieves MAI and also has degree 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ [8] . When n = 2 m , the function σ 2 m−1 achieves MAI [3] . In addition, all the symmetric MAI functions on 2 m variables were obtained in [17, 14] and were proven having algebraic degree 2 m−1 or 2 m . Notice that 2 ⌊log 2 (n−1)⌋ = 2 ⌊log 2 n⌋ if n = 2 m , and 2 ⌊log 2 (n−1)⌋ = 2 m−1 if n = 2 m . Therefore the bound of Corollary 17 is tight. Notice that the relation between algebraic degree and algebraic immunity of symmetric Boolean functions doesn't relate to the number of variables. Therefore the bounds listed in Table 1 and Table 2 are true for any reasonable n. We leave a open problem whether the bound is tight when AI isn't MAI.
Conclusion
Symmetric Boolean functions, which can be considered as compositions of Boolean functions and elementary symmetric functions with power-of-2 degree, behave badly against fast algebraic attacks, so these functions are unfit to be used in stream ciphers. In other words, if symmetric functions are used in the design of ciphers, fast algebraic immunity should never be ignored, and the number n of variables had better be neither equal to nor a little more than 2 m . n approximating 3 · 2 m−1 seems to be a good choice but it still need further study.
